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Solution of the Ellsberg paradox  
by means of the principle of uncertain future 
 
Alexander Harin  
 
The principle of uncertain future: the probability of a future event contains 
an (hidden) uncertainty.  The first consequence of the principle: the real 
values of high probabilities are lower than the preliminarily determined 
ones; conversely, the real values of low probabilities can be higher than the 
preliminarily determined ones.  The first consequence provides an uniform 
solution of the underweighting of high and the overweighting of low 
probabilities, of the Allais paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, the equity 
premium puzzle, the “fourfold pattern” paradox, etc.  The second 
consequence: the present probability system of a future event is incomplete.  
The second consequence provides a solution of the incompleteness of 
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This paper presents a part of the results of Харин (2007) including a solution of the Ellsberg 
paradox in English.   
The final statement of Hey and Orme (1994) was “... we are tempted to conclude by saying 
that our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably well modeled (to what might be termed a 
“reasonable approximation”) as “expected utility plus noise.” Perhaps we should now spend 
some time thinking about the noise, rather than about even more alternatives to expected utility?”  
Harin (2004), Harin (2007), Харин (2007) and this paper renew, generalize and develop this 
statement.   
 
 
1.  Principle of uncertain future 
1.1.  Statement and formal proof of the principle 
General principle of uncertain future 
 
Future events may be considered as, at least partially, uncertain.    
This uncertainty or partial uncertainty may be invisible or imperceptible.  It may be crucial.  
In any case, the overwhelming majority of future events contain, at least a part of uncertainty.  In 
a simple form this principle may sound like:  
 
“A future event contains an uncertainty”   
 
 
Formal proof of the principle 
 
The principle of uncertain future may be proved, e.g., by means of the Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle.  The Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states: 
One cannot simultaneously measure both impulse and position better than with uncertainty  
 
∆p × ∆x ≥ ћ / 2  
where 
∆p   - impulse uncertainty,  
∆x   - position uncertainty,  
ћ   - Planck's constant divided by 2π 
Indeed, the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is true for every object involved in every 
event, including every future event.  Hence, every future event contains an uncertainty.  The 
proof has been completed.   
 
 
Specific principle of uncertain future 
 
The specific principle of uncertain future emphasizes one of uncertain aspects of future 
events, namely probability.  It states probabilities of future events are, to some extent, uncertain.  
This extent may be invisible, imperceptible.  It may be considerable, even crucial.  In any case, 
the overwhelming majority of future events contain, at least, a degree of uncertainty.  In a simple 
form this principle may sound like:  
 




Mathematically, the specific principle may be written in the form of two simplified (in detail 
see Harin 2007) expressions:  
The first 
 
Preal ~ Pplan ± ∆P  
where  
∆P   = (plus) ∆+P and (minus) ∆-P  
The second 
 
Pmean real = Pplan + δP  
where  
Pmean real  - the mean real value of P;  
δP  - the shift, the bias of the mean real value of real or future P in the 
comparison  with the value  of  planned  or  preliminarily determined  P 
(δP may be positive or negative or zero).   
 
 
1.2.  Consequences of the principle   
1.2.1.  First consequence.  The “repulsion” from the “rigid” bounds  
of the range of probability (from 0% and from 100%) 
 
Suppose we wish to test the probability values, which are very close (but not equal) to 0% or 
100%.  For example, we choose 1% or 99%.   
Suppose the uncertainty value (∆P) is essentially more than the distance of the probability 
value from the bound.  For example, ∆P = 10%.   
Then, evidently, (if we make the test as if there is no uncertainty) the mean distance of the 
probability value from the bound cannot be as small as 1% (if the uncertainty value is 10%).   
Generally, the mean distance of the probability value from the bound cannot be considerably 
less than the uncertainty value.   
Thus, the mean value of probability (Preal mean ≡ Preal) cannot be as high as 99%.  It may be 
(*see the second consequence below) more than 1% also.  Or 
 
Phigh real < Phigh plan
*Plow real > Plow plan
 
In other words  
 
“High probability will be lower” 
“Low probability can be higher” 
 
 
1.2.2.  Second consequence.  Incompleteness of the  
present probability system of a future event  
 
The probability of an event, which is not forbidden by objective laws is more than zero (in 
the microcosm virtual events can occur that infringe the laws of conservation).  Hence, an 
unforeseen event with the probability more than zero will occur in any forecast or plan.  Or   
 




∑ Punforeseen > 0%   
∑ Pforeseeable <  100%  
where 
∑ Pforeseeable  - real sum of probabilities of all foreseeable events 
∑ Punforeseen  - real sum of probabilities of all unforeseen events 
 
 
2.  General applications of the principle 
 
The principle of uncertain future, due to its general nature, may be used and is successfully 
used in a variety of fields.  
 
 
2.1.  Logic 
2.1.1.  Possible infringement of the law of the excluded middle 
 
Suppose in present there are a class of events and the negation of this class.  The second 
consequence of the principle allows in future an event occur which do not exactly belong neither 
to this class nor to its negation.   
So, the application of the law of the excluded middle to future events is questionable.  Note, 
already Aristotel proposed similar opinion.   
 
 
2.2.  Probability theory 
2.2.1.  The need of creation of a section of the probability theory 
which will consider real noises and uncertainties 
 
There is the need of creation of a section of the probability theory which will consider real 
noises and uncertainties, errors in measurements, etc.   
 
 
2.2.2.  Splitting of the continuous range of probability 
near 0% and 100%   
 
Noises and uncertainties can lead to splitting of the continuous range of probability near 0% 
and 100%.  Similar phenomena take place in the physics of elementary particles as the violation 
of symmetries.   
 
 
2.3.  Forecasting and planning 
2.3.1.  Creation of a basic equation of forecasting 
 
The principle of uncertain future and sectionally continuous transformation provide creation 




3.  First consequence. Solution of problems of economics 
3.1.  Uniform solution of the underweighting of high 
and the overweighting of low probabilities, 
the Allais paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, 
the equity premium puzzle, the “fourfold pattern” paradox, etc   
 
Solution of the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), risk aversion, loss aversion, overweighting of 
low probabilities, uniform explanation of choices for both gains and losses, the equity premium 
puzzle, etc has been reported in Harin (2007).   
 
 
A simplified solution of the “fourfold pattern” paradox  
 
The “fourfold pattern” paradox (see, e.g., Tversky and Wakker 1995, Fehr-Duda et al 2006) 
is one of the strongest qualitative tests for utility theories.  The well-determined facts are: For 
positive (gains) risky prospects, people typically overweight low probabilities but underweight 
high probabilities.  For negative (losses) risky prospects, people typically underweight low 
probabilities but overweight high probabilities.  This may be written as 
 
1)  For gains at high probabilities people choose guarantee 
Risk < Guarantee  
2)  For gains at low probabilities people choose risk 
Risk > Guarantee  
3)  For losses at high probabilities people choose risk 
Risk > Guarantee  
4)  For losses at low probabilities people choose guarantee 
Risk < Guarantee  
 
From the first consequence of the principle of uncertain future  
Phigh real < Phigh plan  
*Plow real > Plow plan  
making evident conclusion the possibility of *Plow real < Plow plan at the equilibrium is enough to 
people to choose the corresponding choice and to write Plow real < Plow plan,   
denoting the value of the risky gain as G and the value of the risky loss as –G,   
and remembering planned Risk = planned Guarantee we obtain:  
 
1)   Risk = G × Phigh real < G × Phigh plan = Guarantee  
Risk < Guarantee  
 
2)   Risk = G × Plow real > G × Plow plan = Guarantee 
Risk > Guarantee  
 
3)   Risk = -G × Phigh real > -G × Phigh plan = Guarantee 
Risk > Guarantee  
 
4)   Risk = -G × Plow real < -G × Plow plan = Guarantee 




4.  Second consequence.  Solution of problems of economics 
4.1.  Solution of the incompleteness of systems of preferences,  
ambiguity aversion, the Ellsberg paradox, etc 
 
The Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961) (simplified and modified):  The urn U1 contains red 
and black balls with unknown proportion.  The urn U2 contains red and black balls with certain 
proportion 1:1.  You will win $100 if you draw a ball of the determined color from the urns U1 
or U2.  Most people stated that they prefer U1 to U2 for both red and black ball.   
The situation seems as if  
 
Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  100% 
 
or, more exactly,  
 
Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  Pred certain + Pblack certain
 
Consider the Ellsberg paradox from the point of view of the second consequence of the 
principle of uncertain future.  The second consequence states the present probability system of a 
future event is incomplete.   
 
∑ Punforeseen > 0%   
∑ Pforeseeable <  100%  
 
And the more present, initial uncertainty - the more the real sum of probabilities of all 
unforeseen events and the less the real sum of probabilities of all foreseeable events.  If the 
initial uncertainty Unc1 is more than the initial uncertainty Unc2, then  
 
∑ Punforeseen Unc1 > ∑ Punforeseen Unc2  
∑ Pforeseeable Unc1 < ∑ Pforeseeable Unc2  
 
The initial uncertainty of the unknown proportion is evidently more than initial uncertainty of the 
certain proportion.  Hence, the real sum of probabilities of all foreseeable events (red or black) 
for the unknown proportion is or (due to the experience of tested people) seems less than that of 
the certain proportion.   
 
*∑ Punforeseen uncertain > ∑ Punforeseen certain  
*∑ Pforeseeable uncertain < ∑ Pforeseeable certain  
*(is or seems) 
and  
 
*Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  Pred certain + Pblack certain
*(is or seems) 
So, in the light of the second consequence of the principle of uncertain future, the Ellsberg 
paradox is quite natural.   





In a simplified form, the conclusions of this paper may be drawn as follows:  
 
 
The principle of uncertain future 
 
The principle of uncertain future:  
“The probability of a future event contains an (hidden) uncertainty” 
The first consequence of the principle:  
“High probability will be lower” 
“Low probability can be higher” 
or 
Phigh real < Phigh plan
*Plow real > Plow plan
(*can be) 
The second consequence of the principle:  
“The present probability system of future events is incomplete” 
or 
∑ Punforeseen > 0%   
∑ Pforeseeable < 100%  
 
The principle of uncertain future, due to its general nature, may be used and is successfully 
used in a variety of fields, e.g., in logic, in probability theory, in forecasting and planning.   
In economics the first consequence of the principle provides an uniform solution of the 
underweighting of high and the overweighting of low probabilities, of the Allais paradox, risk 
aversion, loss aversion, the equity premium puzzle, the “fourfold pattern” paradox, etc.  More 
detailed application of the principle will provide an explanation of the full shape of the 
probability weighting function.   
 
 
Solution of the Ellsberg paradox 
 
The Ellsberg paradox seems as if  
Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  100% 
or, more exactly,  
Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  Pred certain + Pblack certain
The second consequence of the principle provides a solution of the Ellsberg paradox.  The 
second consequence gives  
 
*∑ Pforeseeable uncertain < ∑ Pforeseeable certain  
*(is or seems) 
and  
*Pred uncertain + Pblack uncertain <  Pred certain + Pblack certain
*(is or seems) 
So, from the point of view of the second consequence of the principle of uncertain future, the 
Ellsberg paradox is quite natural.   
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